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Morality and Situation Ethics, by Dietrich von Hildebrand with Alice von
Hildebrand. Hildebrand Press, 2019. Pp. xxxviii + 180. $16.99 (paperback).
CATHERINE NOLAN, University of Dallas
This newly republished book, originally available in 1955, is an example
of a text which proves its worth by its continued relevance today, and in
circumstances that its author could not have anticipated.
Morality and Situation Ethics has as its primary aim to point out the
flaws of situation ethics, which is the theory that there are no exceptionless
moral rules and that “[t]he morally good is what our conscience tells us to
do in a unique case when we examine all factors before God” (143). I will
summarize this argument in the first part of this review. Von Hildebrand’s
descriptions can be used to illuminate new situations, however, so I will
explore a contemporary application of his work in my second section.
Finally, I will discuss some limitations of the text before summarizing its
highlights.
Because von Hildebrand began to formulate his arguments against
situation ethics before Joseph Fletcher published its manifesto, Situation
Ethics: The New Morality, in 1966, von Hildebrand is criticizing an implicit
theory or “moral mentality” which he finds in literature rather than in academic philosophy or theology. He frames the debate by describing kinds
of moral characters, which he relates to characters in classic works of fiction. The primary contrast used by those who endorse situation ethics,
von Hildebrand claims, is between the “pharisee” and the “tragic sinner.”
The pharisee seeks to obey God, but only as the source of a set of rules
that give him moral superiority over others rather than as an infinitely
holy and mysterious being deserving of our love and adoration. The pharisee, therefore, opposes the spirit of the law—the true meaning of a law,
considered in the context of the rest of morality—in order to follow the
letter of the law—a misinterpreted and isolated law which serves to elevate him and with which he judges others harshly and without mercy. The
situation ethicist is rightly repulsed by such an attitude, and proposes as
an alternate ideal the tragic sinner: one who is fully aware of his own sin
but suffers because it separates him from God, for whom he has a deep
longing. This leads the situation ethicist to a “sin mysticism” which condones—or even glorifies—actions traditionally considered sinful if they
are performed by someone of a generally moral character who is relying
on God’s mercy. Sin is, in these cases, seen as protecting the sinner from
pharisaical pride (91). Von Hildebrand emphasizes that the term “sin” in
the context of this work is not intended to imply anything about the state
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of the sinner’s soul; it refers merely to the breaking of a moral commandment or “attitudes embodying a moral disvalue” and the resultant offense
against God (9).
Von Hildebrand reminds us that the truly Christian approach is neither
the pharisee’s nor the tragic sinner’s; the situation ethicist has in fact created a false dichotomy. While the tragic sinner may be closer to God, von
Hildebrand points out that this closeness is not due to his sin but in spite
of it. For every tragic sinner who longs for God and hesitates to judge his
fellows, there are many who commit the same sin but fail to love God
and are hypocritically ready to condemn others. What saves the tragic sinner are his humility and other good character traits. The humility of the
tragic sinner can also be found in those who have not sinned: the experience of temptation can be enough to show an innocent person his own
weakness and prevent him from the pharisee’s confidence in his moral
superiority (102). Moreover, even if a sin can be instrumental in bringing
someone to a greater awareness of his need for God and his inability to
judge others harshly, we cannot for that reason choose to sin ourselves
or encourage others to sin. Von Hildebrand points out that every sin is
an affront to God, and it would be incoherent to choose to distance oneself from God directly in the hopes of bringing oneself indirectly into a
closer relationship with God (81). There is no context in which we ought
to neglect or disobey God’s laws—or at least the spirit of these laws—in
order to become closer to God. Further, unless we are to assume some sort
of divine revelation occurs each time we make a moral choice, the only
way that we can inform our conscience is by paying attention to God’s
commandments and the morally relevant values (such as the value of the
human person) requiring our response (143). Situation ethics, then, has
failed to prove its conclusions.
Von Hildebrand ends the book with a substantial argument for the contentious claim that the most appropriate moral responses are only available to the Christian: that a deep sense of moral value (such as the rightness
of an act) depends on an awareness of and a relationship with God. While
morally relevant values can be recognized by the non-believer, a belief in
an all-good and all-loving God will make these values even more important—for instance, a human person’s value is seen more clearly when he
is understood to be immortal.
At this point, I would like to claim that the relevance of von Hildebrand’s
text is not restricted to a single, possibly dated, debate. Due to his deep
insight into human experience, the characters von Hildebrand describes
are not unique to a specific era or even to the moral conflict surrounding
situation ethics, but are found wherever humans live in societies. Situation
ethics may be a less prominent threat today (though there are many advocates of similar theories—such as utilitarianism and relativism—who agree
that there are no universal prohibitions since every kind of action could
be right in the right set of circumstances), but von Hildebrand’s characters
are invaluable in understanding new problems that have arisen.
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Given the increasing polarization in politics, religion, and public life,
we are often pressured to adopt strict systems of rules for ourselves in
order to fit into the group with which we identify. Many use these rules to
judge their opponents ruthlessly, as evidenced by the proliferation of scandal-mongering, yellow journalism, and even fake news—not just surviving as clickbait, depending on our curiosity, but promoted and defended
on social media by millions of people. Demonization of the opposition is
found on both sides of most debates; it would be nearly impossible to find
a cause whose defenders are innocent. Nevertheless, it is often difficult
to discern whether we are ourselves engaged in hypocritical judgment of
others or if we are righteously indignant about a genuine horror, and von
Hildebrand’s comparison of self-righteousness and Christian judgment
may help clarify our own actions.
Given these conditions, it seems that the character of the self-righteous zealot has become much more prominent today. Such a man, von
Hildebrand states, is convinced of his own moral correctness or even
superiority, and may indeed want to obey God. Nevertheless, such a person takes pleasure in discovering and pointing out the flaws of others. He
thinks it his moral duty to correct others, assumes the worst about their
behavior, and is “continually indignant, continually scandalized” (21). He
delights in making public the sins of others, since he hopes this will make
his own righteousness more evident to all. A self-righteous zealot even
“prefers to see the other fall rather than to have wrongly predicted his
fall” (22).
While it may be tempting to join the throngs of the self-righteous, von
Hildebrand argues that the Christian ought to approach evildoers with
neither the hypocritical joy that the self-righteous zealot takes in exposing others’ sin, nor the denial of objective moral laws typical of the situation ethicist. Rather, “the Christian will never judge before knowing the
motives, the inner attitude that the sinner himself has toward his sin, and
before knowing all the circumstances. . . . He will not yet form an opinion
of the action’s specific moral quality, of the degree of the man’s responsibility, and still less of the man’s character” (121, italics original). When
confronted with certainty about a sinful act, the intentions of the sinner,
and the circumstances, the Christian’s underlying love of God and neighbor makes him respond in sorrow: sorrow that such an offense against
God has been committed, sorrow that his neighbor has distanced himself
from the source of all good, and an awareness that the Christian himself
could sin in a like manner or could have been instrumental in encouraging this sin—and could even now push the sinner away from God by
his actions. Instead of condemning the other in order to affirm his own
moral standing, von Hildebrand argues that the true Christian will reject
evil, but without assuming any superiority over the sinner. The Christian
should focus on the reconciliation of the sinner to God.
This may seem to leave the Christian in a state of guilty uncertainty
and constant fear about his actions and their repercussions, but von
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Hildebrand argues that such a person will have what he calls “freedom of
spirit”: “a clear sense of the hierarchy of values and of the rank of moral
commandments” (73). Freedom of spirit allows us to distinguish between
the spirit and the letter of the law so that we will not be anxious when a
higher obligation makes a lower obligation impossible. However, freedom
of spirit is not freedom from law, as the situation ethicist would have it. In
opposition to thinkers such as Joseph Fletcher who argue that laws lose
importance in the face of love, von Hildebrand points out that the reverse
is true: when one is motivated by one’s love for God, one will be even
more eager to discover and abide by the laws given us by God (152). It is
true that in particular situations, as long as the available choices are not
morally prohibited, commandments and general rules may not suffice in
determining what is best for us to do: we may need to take into account
what our own vices and weaknesses are and avoid that which will put us
in imprudent moral danger (139). This is always in addition to obeying
God’s commandments, however, not a replacement of these laws.
One minor limitation of this book is that, while the theory is compatible with a broad range of Christian traditions, it is written from a distinctly Catholic perspective. This is emphasized by some of the examples
of sins discussed, e.g., not attending Mass on a Sunday. Obviously, one
can simply substitute examples of similar faults without changing von
Hildebrand’s argument.
Somewhat more problematic is von Hildebrand’s infelicitous use of
terms in categorizing kinds of moral obligation. “Formal obligations” he
defines as obligations “accessible to juridical terms; they are connected
with juridical liabilities,” while “material obligations” are not (59–60).
This does not seem to fit any traditional division of matter and form.
Formal obligations, in this context, can be reduced to material obligations (though he says that it can be tempting for bureaucratic types to
ignore obligations which cannot be stated in legal language) (62). This
makes for some confusing discussion, especially since he later calls the
“intrinsic element of oughtness” the “formal characteristic of the moral
sphere” (128) and—more conventionally—refers to Kant’s ethical theory
as a “formalism” (151).
Another potentially confusing distinction is found in the fourth chapter.
As John Finnis notes in his introduction, von Hildebrand follows Thomas
Aquinas in stating that only prohibitions are to be followed regardless
of circumstances and conflicting moral commands; prescriptions, on the
other hand, may be overridden by other moral obligations (xxvii). Von
Hildebrand mentions prohibitions when he considers whether one can
satisfy the spirit of the law without satisfying the letter; he claims that
this contrast of spirit and letter is not possible for “moral commandments
including an absolute veto. . . . It makes no sense to say that although
someone committed adultery in the literal sense of the word he remains
true to the spirit of the commandment” (55). However, he goes on to make
the same claim about positive moral commandments, qualifying this with
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a footnote noting that a “valid excuse” could be made (55n7). While technically true, this distracts from an otherwise clear distinction he is making,
and the rest of the text is clear that only prohibitions are universally valid.
Despite these minor limitations, Morality and Situation Ethics is well
worth the investment of reading. Besides giving detailed descriptions of a
spectrum of familiar moral characters, von Hildebrand engages in a phenomenological exploration of temptation, sin, and the perception of values, including moral values and morally relevant values. This text builds
on premises central to von Hildebrand’s work: that actions, affective
responses to value, and habitual character traits are all of moral value, and
that we radically misunderstand the moral realm if we attempt to reduce
moral values to only one of these (83; see also Dietrich von Hildebrand,
Ethics (Franciscan Herald Press, 1972)) Nevertheless, enough detail is
given here that one need not have read his other work. This text could
even serve as a brief introduction to—and an indirect argument for—his
ethical theory as a whole.
Morality and Situation Ethics is a clear, coherent, and persuasive book; it
accomplishes the rare feat of challenging both the reader’s abstract moral
theories and his day-to-day habits.

